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In The Supreme Court
of The State of Utah

LEON C. SMITH,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No.
12,399

ALFRED BROWN COMPANY,
Defendant and Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Appeal from Judgment the
Fourth Judicial District Court,
Utah County, State of Utah
The Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, Judge

STATEMENT OF
THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for personal injuries sustained
by plaintiff as a consequence of defendant's negligence in failing to provide a safe place for plaintiff
to work and defendant's failure to comply with
general safety orders of the Utah Industrial Comm1ss1on.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment in favor of the defendant and against
the plaintiff, no cause of action.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks an order remanding the case to
the trial court for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant Brown contracted with Brigham Young
University for construction of a high rise dormitory
kown as Deseret Towers Resident Hall V. Brown
entered into a subcontract with Ashton Construction
Company on December 30, 1968, wherein Ashton was
to do certain masonary work (See subcontract agreement RI69). Plaintiff, Leon C. Smith, age 49, and a
mason since 1951, was employed by Ashton as a brick
mason on the project. In the course of employment,
Smith fell out of a sixth story window and was injured. The window opening was not barricaded as
required in the general safety orders of the Industrial Commission of Utah (See safety provisions
R-94). Smith testified in his deposition (R-108) that
he was working on an interior partition wall and
had constructed the wall up to the ceiling. He had to
lay the last block by splitting it. He stepped down
from the scaffold which was located on the safe side
2

of the interior wall and saw that the last block was
not in proper position. He stepped up on the scaffold
which was approximately two and one-half feet high
and reset the block. He stepped backward the second time off the scaffold in order to restrike another wall when he stepped on an unknown object
that rolled with him. He lost his balance and back
peddled some eight feet to ten feet and thence
through the window opening and fell six stories to
the ground.
Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on
August 31, 1970, attaching thereto the affidavit of
G. E. Knowlton (R-67) and the Subcontract Agreemet (R-69). The Motion came on regularly for hearing before the court on the 25th day of September,
1970, and the court ordered the deposition of Leon
C. Smith published whereupon Mr. Berry made a
motion for summary judgment on the following oral
grounds: (1) lack of negligence; (2) same employer;
and (3) no duty was owed to the plaintiff (R-73).
The court ordered counsel to file memorandum
within ten days with the proviso that if the court
was leaning in favor of the motion that the court
would set the matter for further oral arguments. On
December 18, 1970, the court set the matter for trial
on May 3, 1971, with a jury (R-77). On December 28,
1970, the court, on its own motion, set the matter for

further oral arguments on the motion for summary
judgment (R-76). Oral arguments were heard January 8, 1971, at which time counsel for plaintiff and
defendant were instructed to direct their arguments
to the matter of causation in particular, contributory negligence, and whether the failure of the defendat to barricade the window could be the proximate cause of the injury and also the question of
workmen's compensation (R-81). Even though the
court called up the matter of further oral arguments,
there was no record kept concerning the arguments.
Arguments as to workmen's compensation were tabled and at the court's request, counseln addressed
itself to the proposition posed by the court that
plaintiff's contributory negligence was the proximate cause of the accident, that the defendant's negligence in failing to barricade the window was not
the proximate cause of the accident and therefore,
plaintiff was barred from recovery. The only evidence before the court was a description of the accident by the plaintiff in his deposition and other attached exhibits including the Subcontract Agreement.
The court rejected counsel's arguments that there
was negligence on the part of the defendant for failing to barricade the windows as required by the
safety regulations and that this ommission was a
4

proximate cause of the accident in that it could have
prevented the accident which was a foreseeable occurrence and a reason for the Industrial Commission's safety order requiring barricades on windows
to prevent exactly the tpye of accident which occurred. The court at the hearing did not rule on the case
after hearing arguments but took the matter under
advisement. On January 15, 1971, the court granted
defendant's motion for summary judgment (R-82),
and ruled on January 18, 1971, that plaintiff had no
cause of action and granted summary judgment in
favor of defendant and against plaintiff, dismissing
the action with prejudice (R-78).
Plaintiff moved the court to enter Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law (R-86) along with a
Motion for New Trial (R-88) which defendant resisted (R-83) and which motions the court denied
(R-101). Plaintiff then took its appeal to this honorable court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT PREP ARING FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
Because of the complex nature of this case and
5

the many issues involved, plaintiff requested by a
motion to the trial court that it enter findings of
fact and conclusions of law. The court refused to
enter its findings of fact and conclusions of law
even after such motion knowing nfull well that plaintiff had to appeal its decision and that counsel was
not sure of the basis for the court's ruling. Thus,
counsel is left in a puzzled state inasmuchas the
basis for the court's granting of a general summary
judgment is unknown. Counsel can only second guess
the court in its findings and prepare its arguments
to this court based upon what he thinks to be the
basis of the court decided. This makes appellant's
brief very difficult in that counsel must anticipate
all reasons upon which the court may have based its
decision.

It is true that Rule 52 generally does not require
findings of fact and conclusions of law on decisions
under Rule 56, however, Rule 52 also has an exception which says:
" ... or any other motion except as provided in
Rule 41 (b)."
Rule 41 (b) states:
"If the court renders judgment on the merits

against the plaintiff, the court shall make
findings as provided in Rule 52 (a). Unless
6

the court in its order for dismissal otherwise
specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision
and any dismisal not provided for in this
rule other than a rule for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue, operates as an
adjudication upon the merits."
Plaintiff felt that the court in the above case even
though it had not heard any testimony from witnesses, and made a determination based upon the
merits of the case which had the same effect on
plaintiff as if the trial were held, testimony taken,
and the court then dismissed the case, no cause of
action. Plaintiff felt that by a motion to make findings of fact and conclusions of law to aid in both the
appeal, and the knowledge of the court's decision,
that the court under Rule 41 ( d) was required to
make the requested findings of fact and conclusions
of law.
A review of the Federal rule from which the Utah
rule is modeled reveals that,
"with respect to Rule 56, the 1946 Amendment adopts the theory that a motion for
summary judgment under Rule 56, only
questions of law are presented and no findings of fact and conclusions of law are necessary. There is no necessity for findings of
fact where facts are not at issue and summary judgment presupposes that there are
7

no triable issues of material fact. Although
findings are not necessary on a motion for
summary judgment, some district judges
state in their opinions the reasons for their
conclusions that there is no genuine factual
issue in dispute or set forth facts which they
regard as definitely established. At least
one district court has by rule required the
moveant to serve and file with his motion
'proposed findings of fact and conclusions
of law and proposed summary judgment'.
Such proposed findings shall state the material facts as to which the moving party
contends there is no genuine issue.'' Moores
Federal Practice, Vol. 6, Section 56.02 (11),
p. 2047.
The theory of no findings of fact because there
are no facts at issue is clearly inadequate if facts
are in issue and counsel does not know why the court
rules as it does. In Winter Park Telephone Co. v..
Southern Bell Telephone and Teleg1·aph Co. 181 F2d,
341, 14 FR Serv. 56 c.41, Case 2, the Fifth Circuit
Court reversed a summary judgment for the plaintiff and remanded the case for the making of specific findings of fact and conclusions of law either
from the facts in the record or from the trial of the
issues in due course as the trial court may deem
adviseable and stated where inconsistent hypotheses
might rea~mnably be drawn and as to which the
8

minds of men might differ ... In so far as the court
holds that, in the absence of a final submission of
the case, by both parties, the court may draw fact
inferences on a motion for summary judgment, it is
in error." (Emphasis added)
Plaintiff feels that the facts of the case were not
before the court in a form that would allow the court
to assume the facts were stipulated to or that both
parties agreed to the facts. In fact, there are no
documents before the trial court which outlined the
facts for purposes of stipulating the facts nor was
there a document wherein defendant set forth its
specific grounds and reasons for its motion for summay judgment. It is submitted that the failure of
the court not to submit findings of fact and conclusions of law and in deciding the case without facts
to which counsel had stipulated, was in error in this
case for the reason that Leon C. Smith, the plaintiff, has not had his day in court, has not had an
opportunity ot present evidence in his behalf, and
the court refuses to tell him the basis upon which
he is kept from his day in court which is at least a
breach of the constitutional protections of due process.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CALLING ON
9

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON ITS OWN MOTION AND IN
NOT ESTABLISHING A RECORD UPON WHICH
AN INFORMED APPEAL CAN BE BROUGHT
BEFORE THIS HONORABLE COURT.
There is no place in the present record where the
trial court has established and delineated the issues
in the present case and the reasons for granting
defendant's motion for summary judgment. It is
evident that the motion for summary judgment does
not give the grounds and reasons why judgment
should be granted except to say that, "there is no
genuine issue of fact and that under facts most favorable to plaintiff, the defendant is entitled to judgment in its favor." That statement is incorrect to
begin with because plaintiff has never had the chance
to present to the court the facts most favorable to
him.
The court had stated that it would call the motion
for summary judgment on for additional oral arguments only if it were inclined to grant the motion
for summary judgment. If it is in fact true that the
court was leaning toward granting the motion for
summary judgment, it was incumbent upon the court
to establish a record upon which an appeal could
be made, including a transcript of the oral arguments. It shoulrl also be remembered that at the time
10

the court was hearing defendant's motion for summary judgment, the trial on the matter had been
set following a pre-trial conference and plaintiff
was preparing for that trial.
Rule 56 ( c) has been interpreted not to allow the
court to draw factual inferences in favor of the moving party. The moving party has the burden of clearly establishing that there is no genuine issue of fact.
While the existence of an important, difficult or
complicated question of law is not a bar to a summary judgment, the record must be adequate for
decision of the legal question presented by the motion
for summary judgment. In Moores Federal Practices,
Vol. 6, Sec. 56.16, p. 2447, there is an admonition to
district judges that,
"District courts should not, however, allow the summary judgment procedure to be
used in such a manner that almost as much
expense and effort is incurred in demonstrating that summary judgment should be denied and that the case should go to trial as
the expense and effort involved in the actual
trial. And the record before the court must
be adequate for decision of the legal issue
presented by the motion for summary judgment."

It is submitted that plaintiff has had his case decided against him on an inadequate record. There is
11

no showing of facts upon which to base a decision the issues have ot been specifically framed for decision. There are complex issues involved and many
disputed matters which require a trial with its direct
and cross examination before the legal issues will
be brought in to focus.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
For purposes of clarification, counsel will address
himself to what he thinks are the three main issues
of the case: Subsection A. will deal with contributory negligence which counsel believes is the basis
of the court's decision; subsection B. will deal with
the question of proximate cause which counsel feels
influenced the court's decision; and subsection C.
will deal with the question of Workmen's compensation which counsel does not feel the court reached
and thus did not influence the court's decision, but
which counsel will treat in the event the court did
base its decision on workmen's compensation.
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure has
been interpreted many times by this court and the
following caf;es establish guide lines to be followed.
12

The court in Welchman v. Wood, 9 U2d 25, 337 P2d
410, stated,
"Summary judgment is a drastic remedy
and courts should be reluctant to deprive
litigants of an opportunity to fully present
their contentions upon a trial, and therefore,
summary judgment should be granted only
when under the facts viewed in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, he could not
recover as a matter of law."
The court stated in Young v. Felornia, 121 U 646,
244 P2d 862, certiorari denied, 73 S. Ct. 186, 344 US
886, 97 L. Ed. 685,
"Where there is any genuine issue as to
any material fact, motion for summary
judgment should be denied."
The court stated in Richards v. Anderson, 9 U2d
17, 337 P2d 59 that,
"Summary Judgment is a severe measure
which courts should be reluctant to use and
doubt should be resolved in favor of allowing
a full trial in the case."
To the same effect was Calder v. Siddoway, 8 U2d
174, 330 P2d 494,
"Where pleadings filed and representations made to a trial court at the hearing
disputed plaintiff's claim sufficiently to
13

raise an issue of fact, plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment was properly denied."
The court in Watkins v. Simonds, 11 U2d 46, 354
P2d 852, said,
"Summary judgment as a remedy should
be granted with great caution."
The cases of this type containing pronouncement
on summary judgment are legion; however, the above
cited decisions clearly limit the trial court in its
granting of a summary judgment. Also it is established that when a summary judgment is granted
against a party, he is entitled to have the Trial Court
and Supreme Court on review, consider all of the
evidence and every inference fairly to be derived
threfrom in a light most favorable to him. Richards
v. Anderson, Supra. It has been further stated that
on defendant's motion for summary judgment, plaintiff's contentions must be considered in light most
favorable to his advantage and all doubts resolved
in favor of permitting him to go to trial and only if,
when the whole matter is so viewed, he could, nevertheless, establish no right to recovery, should motion
be granted. Samms v. Eccles, 11 U2d 289. To the same
effect is Foster v. Stead, 19 U2d 435, 432 P2d 60.
Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harmon 17 U2d 420,
413 P2d 807 and ·Thompson v. Ford Motor Company,
395 P2cl 62, 16 U2cl 30.
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The court has also held that a motion for summary
judgment is in effect a demur to claim of plaintiff.
Samms v. Eccles, Supra, also, Williams C. Moore
and Company v. Sanchez, 6 U2d 309, 313 P2d 461.
It is submitted that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in that it decided the case
when there were issues of fact and on wcihh reasonable minds could disagree. For purposes of this appeal, it is submitted that the plaintiffs complaint
states a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Plaintiff alleges that the injuries sustained by him
were a result of defendant's negligence and carelessness in failure to cover a wall opening which defendant had a duty to barricade because of the general
safety rules of the Utah Industrial Commission,
promulgated for the protection of workers and had
the defendant complied with the Industrial Commission orer, the accident would not have occurred,
and at the time of the plaintiff's injury, the defendant had the exclusive control and management of
the facilities where the plaintiff was working and
that the accident causing the injuries suffered by
plaintiff was one which would not ordinarily happen
if the defendant had used proper care and control
of the facilities. Thus, if the complaint taken as true,
which is required by the cases above stated, the
plaintiff has made out a prima facia case based upon

15

defendant's negligence. In answer to the complaint,
the defendant said that the accident was caused by
plaintiff's contributory negligence and later amended its answer to allege that workmen's compensation
was the paintiff's sole remedy.
The questions of defendant's negligence and workmen's compensation both involve many questions of
fact which could never be reconciled. For instance,
the subcontract declares Ashton to be an independent
contractor which is a major factor to consider in
showing that Brown, the prime contractor is not the
emplyer of Smith and that it is liable under third
person liability as provided by statute. The effect of
the safety regulations to show defendant's negligence is also at issue. It must be assumed that the
court's major premise for granting defendant' motion is contributory negligence since it was pleaded
and the other questions are irreconcilably at issue.
a. Contributory Negligence:
Contributory negligence has long been regarded
by the courts as a jury question. There are instances
in which summary judgment has been granted where
the facts were ot in dispute or were stipulated to
and the law was applied as to contributory negligence, however, the record in this case contains no
evidence of there being any stipulation of fact, or

16

soable man which has long been the province of the
jury was applied by the judge to the instant case;
or did the court consider whether the plaintiff had
ever stepped off a scaffold backwards, or whether he
had tripped before, or whether he was conscious of
th danger of the open window, or whether he should
have stepped off on a different place on the scaffold
because of the closeness of the window, or whther
he thought it was safe to step off the scaffold at the
particular place which was close to the window, or
whether the duty of safety and care the employee
owes himself is increased with the nearness to the
window or how far from the window would one have
to be before it would be considered safe for him to
step off a scaffold. Also unanswered are the questions of what caused plaintiff to stumble, and
whether stumbling off a scaffold is a common occurence, and who left the debris on the floor which
plaintiff stepped on, and whether the premises was
a safe place to work by legal standards.
Under the court's ruling, the stepping off of a
scaffold backwards and the stumbling over a piece of
debris and losing one's balance is always contributory egligence because the court must base summary
judgment on the basis that reasonable minds could
not hold otherwise. The cases cited hereinafter clearly show that the standard of care required by a
18

indeed any testimony based upon the adversary system of direct examination and cross examination concerning the accidet and the facts upon which the
question of contributory negligence could be raised.
There is the deposition of the plaintiff whereby
defendant's counsel through the interrogative process of question and answer tries to elicit from Mr.
Smith the facts of the accident itself. A reading of
the deposition of the plaintiff (R-108) from page 24
to page 46 reveals quickly that it is not clear exactly
what happened and in fact, quite the opposite is apparent, that the deposition, because of the question
and answer type of testimony is inconsistent: for
example, the plaintiff couid not have stepped off the
north end of the scaffold as stated on page 30, line 13,
and there is question as to exactly where the plaintiff stepped off of the scaffold and the direction in
which he was facing, the distance from the window
and whether Mr. Smith was on the safe side or dan·
ger side of the interior wall; all of which questions
are relevant to the question of contributory negligence.

It is submitted that the court assumed facts not
properly in evidence and ruled that plaintiff was
negligent as a matter of law for stepping off the
scaffold backwards and to trip on something and lise
his balance. One may ask jf the standard of the rea·
17

is the language of the court concerning negligence
wherein, the court stated,
"Unless the question of negligence is free
from doubt, a court cannot pass upon it as a
question of law, and if the court is in doubt
whether reasonable men might arrive at
different conclusions, then such doubt determines the question to be one of fact for the
jury and not one of law for the court." (citing
cases).
In Rogalski v. Phillips Petroleum Company, 3 U2d
203, 282 P2d 304, an employee fell into a vat containing caustic soda while spring cleaning his employer's truck on a concrete ramp. The court stated that,
"Contributory negligence is a question for
the jury unless all reasonable men could
draw the same conclusions from the facts
as they are shown."
The court further stated,
"A plaintiff will not be held to have been
guilty of contributory negligence if it appears that he had no knowledge or means of
knowledge of danger."
The court submitted the question of contributory
negligence to the jury. To the same effect are the
cases of: Glen v. Gibbons and Reed Company, 1 U2d
308, 265 P2d 1013, wherein the court said,
20

reasonable man is a matter for ·a jury to decide and
must be based upon all of the facts and circumstances
relative to the incident. The case of Allison v. Mc·
Carthy, 106 U 278, 147 P2d 870, involved a railroad
employee who was injured as a result of a collision
between track cars, one of which he was riding on.
The issue in the case was the alleged contributory
negligence of the employee who allegedly violated
certain safety rules. The court ruled that the question
of contributory negligence and the question of the
violation of a safety rule as negligece as a matter of
law was a question for the jury based upon all the
facts available. The court stated,
"In order to be guilty of negligence as a
matter of law, the evidence must be undisputed and the facts must not be conflicting
and must clearly prove that persons alleged
to be negligent acted in the manner in which
a reasonably prudent person would not have
acted under the circumstances, or that he
failed to act in such a manner as a reasonably prudent person would have acted under
the circumstances."

Webb v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 9 U2d 275,
342 P2d 1094, (1959), involves a case in which a man
was injured by an exploding cartridge and the contributory negligence of the man in modifying the
rifle. The importance of the case to the istant matter

the information of Ellis, Hansen, and Breeze was a
very different accident from that described by Leon
C. Smith himself, in his deposition. It is submitted
that the plaintiff should be given the opportunity to
present his case through direct evidence as to what
actually happened so that there would be no question
as to the facts involved in the case.
A plaintiff's right to recover is not affected by his
having contributed to his injury unless he was in
fault in so doing. Fault can be predicated upon the
plaintiff's conduct only where such conduct was in
violation of a duty on his part to exercise care. Contributory negligence, it has been said by the courts,
is the neglect of the duty imposed upon all men to
observe ordinary care for their own safety. It is the
doing of something that a person of ordinary prudence would not do, or the failure to do something
that a person of ordinary prudence would do under
the circumstances, before one can be held to have
been guilty of contributory negligence, the court
must find that some specific act or omission did not
meet the standards exacted by law." 38 Am Jur~ Negligence, Sec. 181, p. 858. (Emphasis added)
The standard of care by which contributory negligence is to be measured is well set forth in 38 Am
Jur, Negligence, Sec. 190, p. 866 wherein it states,
22

"Where more than one inference can be
drawn as to what a reasoably prudent man
would do under patricular circumstances,
the question of contributory negligence is
one for the jury.'';

Moore v. Miles, 108 U 167, 158 P2d 676, states,
"The question of contributory negligence
is for the jury where different conclusions
may be reasonably rawn by different minds
from the same evidence.";
and Y oshitaro Okuda v. Rose, 5 U2d 39, 96 P2d 287,
where the court said.
"Wherever there is uncertainty as to the
existence of negligence or contributory negligence, the question is one of fact to be
settled bya jury regardless of whether the
uncertainty occurred because of conflict of
evidence or because from the facts adduced,
men might honestly draw different conclusions."
From the above cases. it is clear that the question of contributory negligence as a matter of law is
actually a question for the jury based upon all the
evidence as to plaintiff's reasonable actions in light
of his occupation and circumstances. A reading of
the depositions of Leon C. Smith, Roy F. Breeze,
Martell Ellis, Anthony Hansen and Paul Glen Ras·
mussen, clearly show that the accident based upon

21

"The measure of care required by a person
in the interest of his own safety is ordinary
or reasonable care, according to the circumstances of the case. In other words, one must
exercise the same degree of care for his own
safety as is required of another who is under
a duty to protect him against injury. No
fault is properly to be imputed to a man for
not doing what it would have been useless
for him to have done. The fact alone that
the plaintiff sustained an injury does not
establish a want of care on the part of either
him or the defendant. Contributory negligence is to be determined not according to
what the plaintiff or decedent might have
done, but according to 'vhat a reasonable
person would have done under the circumstances. Due care for one's own safety does
not require the exercise of the highest possible degree of care, or the anticipation of
events which while possible, are only slightly probable ... if a person charged with
contributory negligence is shown beyond the
possibility of reasonable contradiction, to
have exercised that degree of care for his
own safety which persons of ordinary prudence and like circumstances are accustomed to use, it may be declared as a matter
of law that he is not guilty of such negligence. Ordinarily, however, the question
whether the plaintiff has exercised ordinary
and reasonable care is to be decided by the
2:)

jury." (Emphasis added).

"Whether a question of contributory negligence is one of law for the court or of fact
for the jury must be determined on the afcts
of the particular case. Generally, however,
the question of contributory negligence is
for the jury to decide upon proper instructions. The question of contributory negligence is for the jury when it arises upon a
state of facts from which reasonable men
fight draw different conclusions, either as
to the facts or the conclusions or inferences
to be drawn from the facts.'' 38 Am Jur,
Negligence, Sec. 349, p. 1053.
It is obvious that there will be many times in
which a person stepping backward off of a scaffold
will not be contributorily negligent, or many times
in which a person stumbles on something which he
does not see for which he will not be contributorily
negligent. It is submitted that the duty of care owed
plaintiff by himself would best be established by
considering the custom of the industry and whether
brick masons step backward off scaffolds and
whether or not any of them have tripped and lost
their balance in doing so. If it is established that
there was no fault on the part of the plaintiff, Mr.
Smith, in doing what he has done many times before,
the question of the negligence of defendant in failing to barricade the window becomes important in
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is made." (citing cases)

It is clear that proximate cause can be an omission
and defendant's failure to comply with the safety
order and provide a safe place to work can be the
basis of holding efendant liable in the event plaintiff
is ot contributorily negligent.
The following cases demonstrate that a violation
of a safety standard such as failure to provide a
safe place to work or failure to barricade windows
as required by the safety regulations of the State
Industrial Commission of Utah impose liability on
the defendant for negligence to the extent that contributory negligence as a defense is often barred or
at least becomes a jury question.
Among the numerous cases dealing with the question of a person or corporation violating safety
standards and being held liable for injuries sustained is Butz v. Union Pacific Railway Co., 233 P2d
332, where the court held that whether a railroad
in the exercise of ordinary prudence and care should
have reasonably foreseen the likelihood of injury
and whether additional precautions should have been
taken by the railroad to provide employee with a
safe place to work were questions for the jury. In
Stout v. Schll, 241 P2d 1109, the court stated,

"It is the nondelegable duty of a master
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that the barricade could have prevented the injury
to Mr. Smith.
B. Proximate Cause
The issue of proximate cause was initially raised
by the court in oral argument wherein the court
posed the question and requested counsel to respond.
The issue as the court saw it was to the effect that
if plaintiff is contributorily negligent then defendant's negligence cannot be the proximate cause of
the accident. Counsel tried to persuade the court
that an omission or failure to discharge a duty can
be a proximate cause of an accident. It was argued
that defendant could have prevented the accident if
it had complied with its duty of safety and that fail·
ure to do so was a proximate cause of the accident.
The court rejected the argument with the contention
that proximate cause was an affirmative act.
Proximate cause is defined in 38 Am Jur, Negli·
gence, Sec. 50, p. 695, as,
"That act or omission which immediately
causes or fails to prevent the injury; an act
or omission occurring or concurring with
another without which act or omission the
injury would not have been inflicted; the
cause which leads to produces or contributes
to produces, or contributes directly to, the
production of the injury of which complaint
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to use ordinary care and prudence in providing his servants with a reasonably safe
place in which to work, reasonably safe tools
and appliances with which to work and reasonably safe and competent fellow servants
with whom to work; failure of any one or
more such duties will render the master
liable for damages approximately resulting
from such failure (citing cases)." (Emphasis added.)
Kelly v. Vogue, 153 P2d 277, involved injuries to
an employee when she fell descending a stairway
and the employer had violated a safety ordinance by
failing to have the stairway provided with a handrail. The jury concluded that the employer was
guilty of negligence which was the proximate cause
of the injury. The Empoyee had contended that the
forward edge of the step gave way causing her to
fall, and the employer contended that the risk that
xisted in the use of the stairway was open and known
to the employee. The question of employees con·
tributory negligence was for the jury.
In Powell v. Vracin, 310 P2d, 27, involved injuries
sustained by defendant's baby sitter when attemptig to retrieve dangerous object with which the child
had been playing she used a wall opening designed
for eventual use as a <loor, but which ha<l not yet been
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provided with outside steps. The court ruled that
the evidence would sustain findings of negligence
and did not require finding as a matter of law that
the baby sitter was contributorily negligent.
Restatement of Torts, Section 483, provies that,

"If defendant's neguigence consists in the
violation of a statute enacted to protect a
class of people from their liability to exercise
self-protective care, a member of such class
is not barred by his contributory negligence
from bodily harm caused by a violation of
such statute.''

The above cases are all in point to a facet of the
instant case. The Kelly case is factually similar to
the instant case and a the cases have pronouncements
of the court as to the duty of the person or entity
charged with the safety of the premises. In his
case, the one charged with the duty of barricading
the windows was the defendant, said duty being a
nondelegable duty. Violation of safety regulations
has the effect as shown in the Kelly case of abQlishing common law defenses. It is submitted that the
safety regulations in the instant case were violated
and that defendant is negligent and that said negligence abolishes the common law defense of contributory negligence or as stated in other cases makes
plaintiff's contributory negligence a jury question.
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It is clear that the question of proximate cause,
contributory negligence and defendant's negligence
are interrelated questions all of which depend on the
facts of the case. The cass cited indicate there are
fact situations wherein a jury of reasonable men
have concluded that plaintiff could recover. It is
submitted that these same cases would allow Leon
C. Smith to recover in the instant case had not the
court erroneously ruled that as a matter of law
plaintiff is contributorily negligent and barred from
recovery.
If the court's reasoning on proximate cause were
correct law, there would be no recovery for railroad
crossing cases where the signals or other warning
devices failed to work. The reason for safety regula·
tions is to protect against forseeable injury. Cer·
tainly, the reason for the safety regulation with
which defendant failed to comply was for the pro·
tection of workers so they would not fall out of the
window. It is forseeable that without fault a work·
man might stumble and lose his balance and for that
reason the forseeable accident is avoided by barricading the window so that it cannot happen. The
court did not correctly consider forseeability and the
effect of defendant's negligence as the proximate
cause of the accident and erred in its decision grant·
ing summary judgment.
2fl

C. Workmen's Compensation.
The question of workmen's compensation was
pleaded as an affirmative defense by defendant by
way of amended complaint and was not discussed by
the court during oral argument. Counsel believes
that workmen's compensation was not the basis of
the court's decision but will treat the subject in this
brief on the assumption that since the issue was
raised, it may have entered into the court's deliberations.
Under Utah Statute, it is clear that workmen's
compensation is not always a workmen's exclusive
remedy. U.C.A. 35-1-62, states that:
"When any injury or death for compensation is payable under this title shall have
been caused by the wrongful act or neglect
of another person not in the same employment, the injured employee, or in case of
death, his dependents, may claim compensation and the injured employee or his heirs
or personal representative may also have an
action for damages against such third person."
Unless defendant can show that plaintiff was in its
"employment" defendant is liable for injuries it
caused under the statute.
The term "not in the same empoyment'' can best

be interpreted in light of other statutes such as UCA
35-1-42 which states:
"When any employee procures any work
to be done wholly or in part for him by a
contractor over whose work he retains supervisin or control and such work is a part
or process in the trade or business of the
employer, such contractor and all persons
employed by him and all subcontractors
under him, and all persons employed by any
such subcontractors, shall be deemed within
the meaning of this section, empoyees of
such original employer."
and UCA 35-1-42 goes on to say:
"Any person, firm or corporation engaged
in the performance of work as an independent contractor shall be deemed an employer
within the meaning of this action."
The statutes have the effect of making Ashton
an independent contractor and for purposes of the
act, the employer of Smith. There is a question of
supervision and control, however, this question is
laid to rest because of the agreement between Ashton
and defendant Brown wherein paragraph eight en·
titled "insurance" the relationship of the parties is
clearly defined as to workmen's compensation as

follows:
"Subcontractor shall provide and maintain
at all times during the performance of this
subcontract the following insurance: (1)
liability insurance for protection of subcontractor's employees ... All insurance required hereunder shall be maintained in full
force and effect in a company or companies
satisfactory to contractor, shall be maintained at subcontractor's expense until performance in full hereof ... "
and in paragraph twelve the contract declares Ashton to be an independent contractor and an employing unit as follows:
"The subcontractor specifically agrees
that he is, or prior to the start of work hereunder will become, an independent contractor
and an employing unit as an employer, to all
applicable unemployment compensation so as
to relieve the contractor of any responsibility or liability for treating subcontrac·
tor's employees as employees of the contractor for the purpose of keeping records, making reports and payment of unemployment
compensation and workmen's compensation
taxes or contributions . . . '' (Emphasis
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added)
Thus, it is crystal clear that by agreement, the
defendant made Ashton an independent contractor
and an employing unit for purposes of workmen's
compensation. Thus, Ashton, becomes an employer
under 35-1-42 of Utah Code Annotated. Defendant,
by contract, is relieved from the responsibility of
paying the premiums of its independent contractor
Ashton and in the bargain loses immunity from suit
given to workmen's compensation then exposing it·
self to liabiity for its negligence under UCA 35-1-62.
A review of the cases dealing with workmen's com·
pensation is rendered somewhat moot in that the
question to be determined in those cases is whether
or not the employer is an independant contractor
which question is decided in the instant case by con·
tract. Representative of the cases are Stricker v.
Industrial Commission, 55 U 603, 188 P 849, 19 ALR
1156, distinguished in 63 U 221, 224 P 885; Angel v.
Industrial Commission, 64 U 105 228 P 509; Bison v.
Industrial Commission, 81 U 58, 21 P2d 536; Murch
Brothers Construction Company v. Industrial Com·
mission, 84 U 494, 36 P2d 1053; and Plewe Construe·
tion Company v. Industrial Commission, 121 U 375,
242 P2cl 561. The above cases would all support the
proposition that Ashton is an independent contrac·
tor. Almost all cases dealt 'vith whether a workman

was covered under workmen's compensation.
Workmen's compensation was based upon a mutual
exchange of rights and liabilities between employers
and employees. As applied to the instant case, workmen's compensation, because of the quid pro quo
concept and the mutual exchange of rights and liabilities, bars plaintiff from suing Ashton, his employer,
but does give him the right to sue Brown for Brown's
negligence inasmuch as Brown did not pay any premiums and in no way has contributed quid pro quo
for immunity from suit. There could be no possible
quid pro quo on Brown's part because of the agreement with Ashton that Brown be released from all
responsibility under workmen's compensation.
It is submitted that Ashton, plaintiff's employer,
is an independent contractor for purposes of workmen's compensation and that the statutes of Utah are
written for the mutual benefit of plaintiff and Ashton for purposes of workmen's compensation. Ashton has paid premiums and under a quid pro quo
exchange of mutual rights and liabilities is entitled
to immunity from suit by plaintiff for injuries incurre on the job. Defendant on the other hand, has
paid no premiums, has specifically made Ashton an
independent contractor for the purpose of relieving
Brown from any responsibility and liability under
workmen's compensation, and is not entitled to im-

munity under workmen's compensation statutes, but
is subject to liability for its negligence under UCA
35-1-62, which allows an injured empoyee to bring
suit against third parties.
CONCLUSION

The court erred in granting defendant's motion for
summary judgment in that it had to make factual
inferences to make its decision which is a violation of
Rule 56 which requires that there be no issues of fact
left unresolved. The instant case involves many unresolved issues of fact. The law outlined above set
forth guideines for ruling on a summary judgment
and the question is a jury question. It is submitted
that this plaintiff has not yet had his day in court 1
and this plaintiff appeals to this honorable court!
for an order remanding the case back to the trial i
court for trial on the merits and the establishing of i
an adequate record. The court further erred in not\
providing findings of fact and conclusions of law:
which would have aided in the preparation of this:
brief.
II
I

Plaintiff is entitled to a fair trial as provided by!
the constitution and for that reason prays the court·
to remand the case to the trial court for that purpose.
Respectfully Submitted,
Jackson Howard
.'Jr:
)•)

